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Professors Avraham and Yuracko’s fine article, Torts and Discrimination, 
calls our attention to a disconcerting and underappreciated aspect of tort law.1 
The entrenched fact of race and gender discrimination exerts a powerful, 
structural influence on tort damages, especially in bodily injury and wrongful 
death cases. Damages in tort—and in private law more generally—are 
reparative. Their role, as Lord Blackburn famously wrote, is to put the plaintiff 
“in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong 
for which he is now getting his . . . reparation.”2 Making the plaintiff whole 
requires that courts determine how the plaintiff’s life would have gone had she 
not been wrongly harmed.3 State of the art methods for calculating both 
“economic and noneconomic damages attributable to past and future harm” 
incorporate the effects of objectionable racial and gender discrimination and 
carry their effects forward.4 In the name of scientific rigor and accuracy, we use 
life expectancy, worklife expectancy, and average wage tables to calculate 
damages.5 To be sure, these tables are generic. We cannot know how any 
particular plaintiff’s life would have gone. However, the guiding aim of putting 
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 1 Ronen Avraham & Kim Yuracko, Torts and Discrimination, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 661 
(2017). As they acknowledge, Professors Avraham and Yuracko’s article builds upon the 
pioneering work of Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & 
JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010). 
 2 Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) 5 App. Cas. 25 (HL) 39 (appeal taken from 
Scot.) (emphasis added). This ideal is often called by its Latin name: restitutio in integrum. 
 3 Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 1, at 664. 
 4 Id. at 665–66. 
 5 Id. 
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the plaintiff in the position that he would have been in but for the wrong calls 
for using more particular tables, when more particular tables are available.6 The 
more that these tables are tailored to the circumstances of men and Caucasians, 
the more they reflect the legacy of long-term race and gender discrimination. 
The more precisely the tables reflect that legacy of discrimination, the more they 
project past discrimination forward.  
Like a Gordian knot, this problem is difficult to untangle, but easy to cut 
through. We might end this practice of projecting past discrimination forward 
by using blended life expectancy, worklife expectancy, and average wage 
expectancy tables, instead of tailored ones. Administratively, this is a simple 
change. Judges have the authority to require the use of blended tables and the 
tables are there for the using. The hard questions that this remedy raises are not 
practical or administrative, but theoretical and normative. Why is tort law drawn 
to project past discrimination forward? And how deeply embedded, 
normatively, is its commitment to doing so? My inclination is to think that the 
feature of tort law at work is basic, but not backed by immense normative 
weight. The feature at issue is central to the law of torts because reparation is 
central to tort, and the use of tailored tables furthers reparation. However, 
reparation mechanisms that undermine equal rights themselves offend important 
tort values. Or so I shall suggest.  
As John Gardner and others have argued, the objective of tort damages is 
not to restore a prior point in time, but to recover a particular narrative arc.7 
Repair and restoration are two different activities.8 When we restore a car we 
return it to its original condition, even if that original condition includes an 
inferior component, or a design that has subsequently been shown to be flawed. 
When we repair a car, we return it to a well-functioning condition; we get it 
back on the road. When we repair a car, we are happy to eliminate an original 
defect, or to improve upon a flawed design.9 Lives are not cars, but the 
distinction between restoration and repair holds nonetheless. Tort damages are 
not about restoring a prior situation as perfectly as we can; their point, rather, is 
to get a life back on its pre-existing narrative arc as best we can.10 This feature 
of tort law—and of private law more generally—cuts quite deep. Private law 
takes the life that the plaintiff had at the time she was wronged as the life to 
which she was entitled. Tort law in particular confers security. When an 
interest—in physical integrity, in privacy, in an established contractual 
arrangement—is deemed worthy of protection by tort, it is secured against 
                                                                                                                     
 6 See id. at 666 (“Traditionally, courts have accepted as evidence life expectancy, work 
life expectancy, and average income values particularized to the plaintiff’s gender and, where 
available, race.”). 
 7 See generally JOHN GARDNER, FROM PERSONAL LIFE TO PRIVATE LAW (forthcoming 
2018) (manuscript ch. 5, at 9) (on file with Ohio State Law Journal). 
 8 ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, REPAIR: THE IMPULSE TO RESTORE IN A FRAGILE WORLD 
(2002) nicely develops the distinctions between repair and restoration.  
 9 Id. at 9–25.  
 10 GARDNER, supra note 7 (manuscript ch. 5, at 9).  
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impairment. Tort law thus confers protection on lives and possessions as they 
are. And when they are wrongly impaired, it tries to get them back on the track 
that they were on. It protects existing value. The problem at hand, of course, is 
that the protection and repair of existing life projects past injustice forward.  
The most perspicuous way to conceive of the predicament at issue is as a 
particular manifestation of a pervasive dilemma. The phenomenon to which 
Professors Avraham and Yuracko are calling our attention is an instantiation of 
Sidgwick’s “paradox of conservative justice.”11 In The Methods of Ethics, 
Henry Sidgwick asked whether otherwise just and desirable political reforms 
could be legitimately resisted on the ground that their implementation would 
upset expectations grounded in existing institutions and the supposition that 
these institutions would continue to exist.12 In the circumstance Sidgwick is 
contemplating, ideal justice requires reform, but conservative justice requires 
respect for the reasonable expectations to which existing institutions and 
entitlements give rise.13 The result is a moral dilemma, and a pervasive one:  
Every reform of an imperfect practice or [an unjust] institution is likely to be 
unfair to someone or other. To change the rules in the middle of the game, even 
when those rules were not altogether fair, will disappoint the honest 
expectations of those whose prior commitments and life plans were made in 
genuine reliance on the continuance of the old rules.14  
We have prima facie obligations both to reform unjust institutions and to 
honor the reasonable expectations to which existing institutions give rise. When 
these obligations conflict—as they commonly do—we cannot fully discharge 
both obligations. Theory can help to illuminate our predicament, but the 
resolution of any particular predicament requires a context-sensitive judgment. 
We must balance the injustice of the existing institutions against the extent of 
justified reliance upon those institutions. However we strike this balance, we are 
likely to treat someone unfairly.  
I. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
Three perspectives on the predicament at hand come readily to mind. One 
of these might be called the perspective of strict corrective justice. On this view, 
tort law seeks only to do justice between the parties to a particular tortious 
                                                                                                                     
 11 HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS bk. III, ch. V (Hackett Publ’g Co., 7th 
ed. 1981) (1907). 
 12 Id. at 271–74, 293–94. For a discussion of “the dilemma of conservative justice,” see 
JUHA RÄIKKÄ, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN PRACTICE: QUESTIONS IN ETHICS AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY ch. 2 (2014). For related discussions, see also JOEL FEINBERG, Duty and 
Obligation in the Non-Ideal World, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 252, 
252–64 (1980), and JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 212–13, 308–12 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 13 See SIDGWICK, supra note 11, at 271–74, 293–94. 
 14 FEINBERG, supra note 12, at 257. 
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wrong. It excludes all other considerations.15 Arguably, this position calls for 
ignoring the fact that our best efforts to restore wronged victims to the lives they 
would otherwise have led will entrench social injustices. Racial and gender 
discrimination are systemic wrongs. Repairing pervasive social injustices is not 
the responsibility of the law of torts. The rectification of such injustices is the 
task of public law, or perhaps of society at large. Tort law’s task is to do justice 
between the parties. It would be both a perversion of tort law’s role to pursue 
social justice at the expense of corrective justice, and a wrong to the party whose 
right had been violated to compromise his right to reparation in the name of 
social justice. We would be sacrificing him as a means to a socially desirable 
end. The burden of repairing widespread social injustice should be shared 
widely, not imposed on those unfortunate enough to be wrongly harmed.  
To be sure, there is room for disagreement over whether corrective justice 
theorists are committed to this interpretation of what justice demands. Perhaps 
they can embrace the suggestion that tort law’s constitutive commitment to 
being a regime of equal right enables it to support purging our methods of 
computing damages of the effects of objectionable racial and gender 
discrimination, even when doing so departs from the precept of putting the 
victim in the position that he would have been but for the wrong committed 
against him. Supposing, however, that strict corrective justice theorists are 
committed to insisting that justice between the parties—and only justice 
between the parties—be done, there is something implausible about the claim 
that the form of tort law by itself establishes the absolute priority of the claims 
of conservative justice over the claims of ideal justice. Just how to weigh the 
conflicting claims of corrective justice strictly construed and social justice is a 
substantive question, not a formal one, and a highly contextual question at that. 
The only way to fix the weights of these two competing forms of justice is by 
evaluating as best we can the considerations that bear on them in the context at 
hand.  
II. EFFICIENCY AND EQUALITY 
Conventional law and economics provides a second perspective. Torts and 
Discrimination plumbs this perspective at considerable depth, and Avraham and 
Yuracko work hard to bring law and economics in line with the cause of social 
                                                                                                                     
 15 Ernest Weinrib’s work is often associated with this position. See generally ERNEST 
J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995). ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS (2016) 
also comes to mind. I suspect that both views leave room for argument over how to respond 
to the dilemma that Professors Avraham and Yuracko identify because they take equal rights 
as their fundamental value. I shall not try to puzzle out just how they might avoid the position 
described in the text. Instead, I shall state the hard-edged position that corrective justice 
appears to imply. At the very least, the hard-edged position fleshes out a plausible case for 
leaving our practices just as they are, even if those practices further racial and gender 
injustice.  
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reform.16 Their article attempts to defend the obvious claim that discrimination 
is wrong within the four corners of the law and economics framework.17 This is 
understandable and admirable, given the influence and importance of law and 
economics, but it brings two problems in tow. First, law and economics makes 
use of modified Pareto criteria. It accepts existing entitlements as the baseline 
against which changes are measured, and it pursues changes that make at least 
one person better off without making anyone worse off.18 In this context, the 
implications of a stringently Paretian position are troubling. When people’s 
lives, possessions and reasonable expectations reflect the effects of pervasive 
racial and gender discrimination, such discrimination is baked into the baseline 
against which changes are measured.19 Sidgwick’s “paradox of conservative 
justice” rears its head once again.20 Entitlements that are the product of injustice 
are accepted as sacrosanct, and changes that repair injustices embedded in those 
entitlements are ruled out. Only changes that make no one worse off are Pareto 
improvements.21 Righting the past wrongs of discrimination by purging damage 
tables of the effects of past discrimination takes something away from those 
who have benefitted from wrongful discrimination. Just reform makes the 
beneficiaries of past injustice worse off. If this is to be done it should be done 
by some society-wide institutional mechanism—by the tax system, not by the 
law of torts.22  
Second, orthodox law and economics is welfarist.23 It takes welfare to be 
the only and master value. Other goods are valuable only insofar as they 
                                                                                                                     
 16 Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 1, pt. IV.C. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Usually, law and economics uses the Kaldor-Hicks or potential Pareto superiority 
criterion. The potential Pareto superiority criterion allows changes which make some people 
worse off as long as those who are made better off are made sufficiently better off that they 
would be able to compensate those who are made worse off. This criterion preserves the 
existing distribution of entitlements as the baseline from which changes are evaluated, but 
permits changes that make some people worse off. For explanation and discussion of the 
Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks criteria, see JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 
97–105 (1988). See also A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 7 & n.4 (4th ed. 2011) (relating Pareto criteria to the basic idea behind the 
concept of efficiency—the idea of maximizing “the size of the pie”); Robert D. Cooter, The 
Best Right Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 817, 827–29 (1989) (identifying cost-benefit analysis as a technique for applying Pareto 
efficiency criteria). It is difficult to know how to apply this criterion to changes which make 
the world more just. For example, does giving women the vote make them sufficiently better 
off that they would be able to compensate men who are made worse off? Does giving women 
the vote actually make men worse off? This Response will ignore these difficult questions 
and work with the roughly true assumption that people’s existing entitlements are the starting 
point for economic analysis.  
 19 See FEINBERG, supra note 12, at 257. 
 20 See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 21 See the sources cited supra note 18. 
 22 See Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 1, at 699 n.215.  
 23 Id. pt. IV, especially text accompanying note 281.  
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contribute to welfare. This commitment to welfarism creates further difficulties. 
The wrong of racial and gender discrimination offends equality. Morally 
speaking, all competent, adult human beings are equals. Their moral equality 
should be reflected by equality of legal rights. Race and gender discrimination 
wrongly deny this equality. The idea that people are moral and political equals 
and should be treated accordingly is, however, hard to incorporate into a 
welfarist framework. Equality is itself a value—something worth realizing for 
its own sake. Welfarism denies this.24 It asserts that welfare is the only value; 
everything else is valuable only insofar as it promotes welfare.25 To work 
around this denial, Avraham and Yuracko posit that people’s own welfare 
functions incorporate a preference for equality.26  
Within the framework of welfare economics, however, whether people’s 
welfare functions do or do not incorporate a preference for equality is a 
contingent matter.27 Self-interested rational egoists might prefer that everyone 
be treated as moral equals, and they might not. But even if self-interested 
rational egoists do happen to have preferences for equality, this way of 
expressing the value of equality misses the moral point. The moral point is that 
people are equals. The equality of persons obligates us: we are all morally 
required to accord others the equal consideration, respect, and treatment owed 
our moral, legal, and political equals. So doing may or may not promote our 
own well-being. Whether or not it does is beside the point. We are duty-bound 
to treat others as our equals even if (or when) so doing does not promote our 
own well-being. Obligation and welfare are different dimensions of value. 
Something of fundamental importance is lost when an obligation is re-
conceptualized as an aspect of welfare.  
III. EQUAL RIGHT AND REMEDIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT 
A third way to think about the matter at hand is to ask what place equality 
has in tort law, and how equality’s place in tort law bears on the dilemma that 
Avraham and Yuracko identify. Implicitly, Avraham and Yuracko appeal to the 
importance of equality when they point out the disturbing implications of our 
damage calculation practices on the safety of rich and poor, men and women, 
white and black: 
                                                                                                                     
 24 See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 18–28 (1st 
Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed. 2006). 
 25 Id. at 24–28.  
 26 Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 1, pt. IV.  
 27 Empirically, it is all too clear that people may have objectionable preferences, 
including inegalitarian, bigoted, and malevolent ones. Theoretically, the default position in 
welfare economics is that all preferences count. There is no logical reason why people cannot 
find pleasure in the satisfaction of morally objectionable preferences. For an exposition of 
this view, see KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 24, at 409–31. 
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 The fact that courts presumably apply the same standard of care across all 
neighborhoods regardless of the racial or socioeconomic composition of their 
residents might promote the misconception that race and gender do not matter. 
That, of course, is a mistake: race and gender in fact play a crucial role in the 
calculation of damages, and therefore in potential tortfeasors’ precaution 
decisions. . . . Since blacks and women in the United States earn less than 
whites and men, respectively, the damages black women receive for future 
losses caused by bodily injury or wrongful death are lower than the damages 
their white male counterparts would receive. The disadvantage blacks and 
women suffer in the United States, in terms of their job market prospects, are 
reflected in the level of tort damages they receive.  
 The conclusion is unavoidable: it is less costly for [a company such as 
PhedEx] to have accidents involving blacks (especially females) than whites 
(especially males).28 
We should be disturbed by this outcome not just because we value equality, 
but because tort law itself asserts that people have equal rights to safety and due 
care. Equality of legal rights is a constitutive commitment of a liberal 
democratic legal system. Yet, tort law undercuts its own commitment to equality 
of right by computing damages in ways that reflect not only income and wealth 
but also race and gender. The result is a system that incentivizes harming those 
who are less privileged—a system that denies the equality that tort formally 
promises.  
What should we make of a circumstance where remedy undermines equal 
right in this way? To answer that question, we must step back and gain a bit of 
perspective on tort law. Obligations imposed by law to conduct oneself in 
various ways with respect to other people are a necessary part of any legal 
system. When people go about their lives in civil society, their ordinary 
interactions inevitably bring them into conflict with one another. Accidents are 
the byproduct of productive activity and they are not wholly avoidable. Tort 
law, or its equivalent, must exist because these interactions must be governed. 
Next, we need to recognize that tort law is a matter of obligation and that 
remedial responsibilities in tort law are secondary, not primary. Remedial 
responsibilities arise out of failures to discharge antecedent responsibilities to 
respect various rights and to avoid the infliction of various harms on other 
persons.29 Tort law is a law of wrongs, not just a law of redress for wrongs. In 
                                                                                                                     
 28 Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 1, at 664 (footnotes omitted). This example opens 
the article.  
 29 The distinction between primary and remedial legal norms bears on tort in a particular 
form, but it is a general distinction. Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks explain the 
general distinction in the following way:  
Every general directive arrangement contemplates something which it expects or 
hopes to happen when the arrangement works successfully. This is the primary purpose 
of the arrangement, and the provisions which describe what this purpose is are the 
primary provisions.  
36 A RESPONSE TO AVRAHAM & YURACKO [2017 
the first instance, the law of torts enjoins respect for a set of equal rights that 
people have against one another just in virtue of their standing as members of 
civil society. Tort law obligations are owed by members of civil society to one 
another in virtue of every citizen’s standing as an equal person. Logically and 
normatively, secondary obligations of repair are dependent on primary 
obligations of respect.30  
Logically, remedial responsibilities are conditioned on, and arise out of, 
failures to discharge primary ones.31 Normatively, primary responsibilities 
provide the reason for honoring remedial responsibilities and largely determine 
the shape of remedial responsibilities.32 Breaching primary responsibilities 
leaves those responsibilities undischarged and puts the breaching party in a 
position where it is no longer able to discharge its primary responsibilities in the 
best way possible.33 Repairing wrongful harm is the next best way of complying 
with an obligation not to do harm wrongly in the first place.34 Rights and 
remedies form a unity in which rights have priority because the role of remedial 
responsibility is to enforce the plaintiff’s right and to repair the harm done by 
its violation.35 The consequence of the facts that remedial responsibilities are 
subordinate to primary ones while primary responsibilities are matters of equal 
right is that tort remedies ought to support—not undermine—equality of 
primary right. And the practices of relying on life expectancy, worklife 
expectancy, and average wage tables that Avraham and Yuracko describe 
undermine equality of right.36  
Taking equal right—and therefore equal obligation—seriously leads us to 
reframe Avraham’s and Yuracko’s account of the PhedEx case. Avraham and 
Yuracko are right to observe that it is rational for PhedEx to route its trucks 
through poor, nonwhite neighborhoods. The practice is rational because it 
responds intelligently to the message of the tort system understood as a pricing 
mechanism and promotes PhedEx’s self-interest in minimizing the costs of its 
activities. But that practice is also unreasonable.37 Rational practices are 
                                                                                                                     
Every arrangement, however, must contemplate also the possibility that on 
occasion its directions will not be complied with. . . . The provisions of an arrangement 
which tell what happens in the event of noncompliance or other deviation may be called 
the remedial provisions. 
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 122 (William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).  
 30 See Gregory C. Keating, The Priority of Respect over Repair, 18 LEGAL THEORY 293, 
308–10 (2012).  
 31 Id. at 308. 
 32 Id. at 309. 
 33 Id. at 309–10. 
 34 Id. at 310. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 1, at 665–66.  
 37 See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 311, 311–12 (1996). 
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justifiable from the point of view of those whose interests they advance.38 
Reasonable practices are justifiable to those they disadvantage, as well as to 
those who benefit from them.39 PhedEx’s practice is unreasonable because it is 
not justifiable to those whose lives it sacrifices for cost-minimization. The first 
reason why this is the case is that PhedEx’s practice undermines the obligation 
to treat everyone’s safety as equally valuable. This commitment is fundamental 
to tort law. Those whose lives are devalued and endangered by PhedEx’s 
practice also have good reason to object to a remedial practice—a method of 
computing damages—that both devalues their lives and subjects them to an 
unjustified increased risk of harm. Tort law’s method of computing damages 
subverts equality both expressively and instrumentally. Last but not least, this 
criticism may be voiced as an internal criticism of tort law. The way in which 
remedies are articulated undermines equality of primary right. In economic 
terms, we have an incentive-compatibility problem.40 In tort law terms, we have 
an internal contradiction. The incentives provided by tort damages undermine 
tort law’s commitment to equality of right, instead of supporting that 
commitment. Insofar as tort remedies exist to support rights, this is an internal 
defect in tort law’s institutional design, and an internal reason to reform tort law.  
The dissonance between rights and remedies might be rectified in diverse 
ways. For example, we might impose punitive damages on firms that act as 
PhedEx does in Avraham and Yuracko’s example. Or we might enjoin practices 
such as PhedEx’s. I want to set these possible remedies aside, however, to 
confront the question that Avraham and Yuracko pose: should we change the 
way in which we compute tort damages?41 And if we should, to what extent can 
we square doing so with the normative commitments of tort law itself? When 
we consider this reform measure, we return our attention to the fact that tort 
damages are reparative. They aim to put the victims of tortious wrongs in the 
positions that they would have occupied had they not been wronged.42 Victims 
who are white and/or male will have been benefitting, de facto, from the effects 
of past (and present) discrimination. Using tailored tables tracks this fact, 
objectionable as it is. But using tailored tables also undermines equality of 
primary rights. Using blended tables, by contrast, brings tort remedies in line 
with tort law’s commitment to equality of primary rights and mitigates the 
effects of entrenched discrimination. But it does so by rendering less perfect 
corrective justice. By design, blended tables restore victims of tortious 
wrongdoing who have benefitted from wrongful discrimination to less of what 
they once had than do tables that do not seek to remedy the effects of such 
discrimination.  
                                                                                                                     
 38 Id. at 312. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See generally John O. Ledyard, Incentive Compatibility and Incomplete Information, 
18 J. ECON. THEORY 171 (1978). 
 41 See generally Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 1. 
 42 MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 14 (9th ed. 2011).  
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We have, then, a particular instantiation of the “paradox of conservative 
justice.” Tailored tables restore victims more exactly to the condition that was 
wrongly taken away from them; blended tables deliver a more just world.  
A. The Reliance Interests of Potential Victims 
When we struggle with how to resolve this conflict between the claims of 
the world as it is and the claims of the world as it ought to be, the question of 
justified reliance comes to the fore. The strength of claims grounded in existing 
imperfect institutions depends very much on how much—and how justifiably—
those institutions have been relied upon. In theory, both potential victims and 
potential injurers might rely on our present practices of damage computation 
and be both surprised and disadvantaged by the reform of those practices.  
The reliance interests of potential tort victims appear to be quite weak. It 
attempts to secure people against various forms of harm and certain violations 
of their rights. Especially when the harm against which tort law secures people 
is accidentally inflicted, tort law does not invite extensive reliance on the part 
of those it protects. Tort is not tax. Many people do plan their financial affairs 
on the basis of tax considerations. In so doing, they have little choice but to rely 
on the tax law in effect at the time of their planning.43 By contrast, the law of 
tort damages as it now exists does not generally induce reliance on the part of 
prospective victims of tortious wrongs. People don’t plan their walks across the 
street or their choices of residential neighborhood on the basis of their 
understanding of the damages to which they will be entitled if they are hit by a 
PhedEx Truck while out for a stroll. Normal people do not plan on suffering 
accidental injury because, say, it’s worth doing for the damage judgment. 
Accidental injury, moreover, is not the sort of thing you can plan on suffering 
in a straightforward way.44  
Consequently, the only plausible forms of victim reliance on tort damage 
practices as they presently exist are second-order. One might, for example, 
purchase first-party loss insurance against accidental injury, or against some 
broader class of losses that encompasses the costs of accidental injury.45 Such 
insurance might replace or supplement any tort damages one might receive in 
connection with suffering some covered injury. First-party loss insurance does 
exist, and it is often meshed with tort damages through the workings of the 
                                                                                                                     
 43 To be sure, it is possible to plan for some contingencies, including changes in the 
law, but this is the exception not the rule.  
 44 We might imagine that a more egalitarian law of torts would compensate high-
income and high-wealth victims less generously than our present system does. If such a body 
of law were to develop, it would be desirable for potential victims to purchase additional 
insurance to replace income and wealth not covered by tort damages. Such insurance would 
increase the attractiveness of a more egalitarian system of tort damages.  
 45 Most people have some such insurance in the form of health insurance. For most of 
us, health insurance is an employer-provided employment benefit. Neither the amount nor 
the cost of such insurance is tailored to the details of tort damages.  
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collateral source rule.46 It seems quite unlikely, however, that such insurance is 
tailored and priced precisely to the details of tort damages. It is therefore 
difficult to see how a change to blended tables would seriously and 
systematically disadvantage any insureds even if the change catches them 
unaware. Any reliance interest that might exist is faint and attenuated at best. In 
short, it seems that the reliance interests of prospective victims on our present 
practices of computing damages do not look strong enough to make out a 
compelling case against changing our tort damage practices in order to cleanse 
them of the effects of wrongful discrimination.  
B. The Reliance Interests of Potential Injurers 
What about the reliance interests of prospective injurers? In Professors 
Avraham and Yuracko’s article, prospective injurers rely on our present 
gendered and racist practices of computing tort damages.47 PhedEx plans its 
conduct around the practice of tort damages as it now exists. Its reliance, though, 
is very weakly justified, if it is justified at all. PhedEx is gaming the system in 
a way that undermines tort law’s integrity and thwarts its commitment to 
equality of primary rights. This makes a difference. A player or a team that 
exploits a loophole in the rules of the game generally cannot complain when that 
loophole is closed. A player or a team whose conduct cleverly evades the rules 
of the game is in an even weaker position. Such conduct violates the duty of fair 
play and borders on bad faith.48 PhedEx is in just that kind of position. Its 
practice of routing its trucks through poorer, less white neighborhoods treats its 
legal obligations as mere prices.  
Because it is gaming the law of torts in a way, which at least borders on bad 
faith, PhedEx cannot claim strong reliance interests in the continuation of the 
practices whose weaknesses it exploits. Indeed, there is at least prima facie 
reason to think that PhedEx’s practices open it up to the possibility of punitive 
damages. Not only do those practices discriminate wrongly against some 
people, they also expose those people to unjustified increased risks of harm, and 
deliberately so. PhedEx’s behavior is a subversive attempt to evade its legal 
obligations. And the obligations that it is attempting to evade are obligations 
owed directly to other people. Tort is not tax. Shirking one’s tax obligations 
                                                                                                                     
 46 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (stating that 
the collateral source rule provides that “[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the 
injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although 
they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable”). The rule has undergone 
substantial and controversial erosion over the past generation. For a general discussion, see 
Lori A. Roberts, Rhetoric, Reality, and the Wrongful Abrogation of the Collateral Source 
Rule in Personal Injury Cases, 31 REV. LITIG. 99 (2012). See also Tom Baker, Liability 
Insurance, Moral Luck, and Auto Accidents, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 165, 172–73 
(2008). 
 47 See generally Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 1. 
 48 See generally JOHN RAWLS, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play (1964), 
reprinted in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 117 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).  
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involves failing to shoulder one’s fair share of the costs of government. It does 
not involve direct wrongdoing to others. Shirking one’s tort obligations in the 
way that PhedEx does involves mistreating other people by failing to accord 
proper weight to the physical integrity of their persons. The wrong of failing to 
respect the rights of others to the physical integrity of their persons is different 
in kind from the wrong of failing to do one’s part to uphold a public institution. 
Avoiding one’s tort obligations unjustifiably endangers some people because 
they are poor, black, or otherwise disadvantaged. Punitive damages are at least 
plausible. The lesson here, for our purposes, is that the conscious commission 
of a wrong does not create a compelling bootstrap case for continuation of the 
practice whose flaws enable the commission of that wrong. If anything, 
PhedEx’s conduct cuts the other way; it augments the case for reform and 
underscores its urgency.  
The only plausible complaint of “conservative justice” that I can see is the 
complaint that white people and men who suffer tortiously inflicted harms might 
have. They will be made worse off by a shift to blended tables, and they may 
object that they are being unfairly singled out to bear the costs of rectifying 
systemic gender and race discrimination. The factual predicate of this claim 
seems correct: only white people and men who are tortiously injured will bear 
this particular cost of rectifying systemic injustice. Even so, it is hard to say just 
how strong this objection is. For one thing, it may be that the rectification of 
systemic injustices is often best accomplished by innumerable local changes, all 
of which fall on different groups of people. When that happens, the distributive 
injustice of singling some out to bear more than their fair share of the costs of 
rectification does not exist. There is, of course, no way of knowing if others are 
bearing the costs of local reforms similar to those that white and male victims 
of tortious wrongs will bear if tailored tables are replaced by blended ones. At 
best, we can only guess.  
Additionally, the injustice of bearing more than one’s fair share of the cost 
of justified reform has to be compared to the injustice of continuing an unjust 
practice. Continuing the unjust practice may well be the lesser injustice. This is 
the kind of “all things considered” judgment we must make when we confront 
questions of non-ideal justice. My own inclination is to think that, in this case, 
continuing the unjust practice is the greater wrong. On the one hand, 
discrimination is a serious wrong and equality of right is an important good. On 
the other hand, the claim that one should be put back on the track of one’s prior 
life insofar as it was advantaged by past discrimination is problematic. The case 
that one justifiably relied on the continuation of wrongful discrimination is weak 
both because the discrimination was wrongful and because it is difficult to rely 
on the details of tort law practices for computing damages.  
Still, changes that make some people worse off and explicitly so are usually 
politically unattractive. Those who are made worse off may perceive themselves 
to be punished for past wrongs in which they had no part and for which they 
bear no responsibility. This possibility points up the attractiveness of Professors 
Chamallas and Wriggins’ proposal to rectify the injustice of past discrimination 
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by levelling up, not down.49 We might, that is, give everyone damages based on 
the tables now used for white men. This option eliminates the cross-
subsidization of everyone else by injured white men and replaces that cross-
subsidization with an upward adjustment in prices and services. That upward 
adjustment will reflect the increased cost of liability in a damages regime that 
levels up. Importantly, it will also distribute the costs of rectifying past unjust 
discrimination across all customers of the goods and services affected by the 
reform. That distribution is attractive because it is broader. Because it is broader, 
it is fairer in two ways. First, it does not single out white male victims for bearing 
the costs of social justice. Second, it does distribute the costs of achieving a 
more just world across a larger portion of society. These two effects are, of 
course, flip sides of the same coin.  
My own view is that either leveling up or leveling down are justifiable 
reforms that judges may legitimately institute by virtue of their discretionary 
authority over our practices of calculating damages. I can, however, claim no 
special authority for my opinion that rejecting the use of tailored tables and 
adopting the use of blended ones is at least the lesser injustice. Nor can I claim 
special authority for my view that over-deterrence should worry us less than 
under-deterrence, though I believe that I can give reasons for both positions. 
Theory can clarify the considerations at stake, but we must all decide for 
ourselves how to evaluate the competing considerations that theory identifies 
and clarifies. In coming to our conclusions about what should be done, we each 
and all have only the standing of equal, democratic citizens. Judges, for their 
part, do have a special authority. The standard understanding of their role grants 
them discretion to revise the computation of tort damages to purge that practice 
of gender and racial bias if they so decide. All that they owe the rest of us is a 
reasoned explanation of their decision. Professors Avraham and Yuracko are to 
be commended for opening our eyes to the injustice that tort law is perpetuating 
and for delving so deeply into its dimensions.  
                                                                                                                     
 49 See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 1, at 158–70. Professors Avraham and 
Yuracko reject this proposal because they believe that it will lead to overdeterrence. See 
Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 1, at 726. How much weight one puts on that objection 
depends significantly on how persuaded one is by the economic analysis of tort.  
